Direct selling companies operating in the United States face a constantly evolving legal and regulatory landscape. Business practices and methods that were once viewed as acceptable or compliant may now invite significant legal or regulatory risk to a company and its stakeholders. Companies should, therefore, regularly evaluate their business practices to ensure that their risk profile has not increased due to business activities that are now deemed noncompliant or illegal.
Commit to Policing Improper Earnings Claims
Improper earnings claims are typically what will put a company on the radar of the Federal Trade Commission. Recently, the FTC launched a new rulemaking initiative to address deceptive earnings claims. Companies that do not have issues with improper earnings claims are much less likely to attract FTC scrutiny. Therefore, ensuring that your company is not publishing improper earnings claims is a logical place to start. In its complaint filed against AdvoCare, the FTC listed numerous examples of improper earnings claims made at AdvoCare-sponsored events and on company-created social media posts and webinars. Companies should ensure that their marketing personnel are properly trained on what is and is not a permissible earnings claim.
Just as importantly, companies must publish accurate data reflecting the earnings of all program participants. An income claim is considered deceptive if information is not disclosed showing what potential participants can typically expect to earn. A company’s Income Disclosure Statement (IDS) is a critical document. The FTC’s issue with AdvoCare’s Income Disclosure Statement was that it only reported earnings data for active distributors. Advocare defined active distributors as participants who earned income in the previous year. The FTC alleged that AdvoCare’s IDS was deceptive because less than 30 percent of all AdvoCare distributors earned income. By only disclosing the earnings data for active distributors on its IDS, the FTC alleged that the IDS was misleading because it failed to include earnings data for more than 70 percent of AdvoCare distributors. Done properly, the IDS can be an important insurance policy for MLM companies. A full and transparent disclosure of all participant earnings will significantly reduce a company’s exposure to regulatory scrutiny. On the other hand, an incomplete or misleading IDS can provide evidence the FTC relies on in concluding that a company has made deceptive earnings representations in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
The biggest challenge a company faces in reducing exposure for improper earnings claims is in policing claims made by members of its sales force. The FTC has unequivocally stated that it intends to hold MLM companies responsible for improper earnings claims made by their distributors. Companies must do much more than simply have policies in place that prohibit distributors from making improper earnings claims and occasionally enforce those policies. In today’s regulatory climate, companies must implement a training program that educates distributors on what is and is not a permissible earnings claim. Companies must also commit to terminating distributors at any level or rank who persist in making improper earnings claims. Companies must also actively monitor distributor social media posts and compel the removal of social media posts that contain improper earnings claims.
Take a Fresh Look at Your Company’s Compensation Plan
In the current regulatory climate, the FTC has prioritized scrutiny of MLM compensation plans. This heightened attention means that all MLM companies should review their compensation plans to avoid getting caught in the FTC’s crosshairs. Here are a few things to consider when evaluating your company’s compensation plan:
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The compensation plan should reflect that commissions and advancement awards are based primarily on verifiable retail sales volume, not participant purchases.
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Regardless of a compensation plan’s terminology, an emphasis on recruiting over selling products is viewed by the FTC as indicative of an illegal pyramid scheme. In its 2019 complaint against AdvoCare, the FTC was critical of a Rookie Bonus that rewarded AdvoCare distributors who recruited at least three new distributors while generating sales volume from the new recruits. The FTC found this bonus to be indicative of an emphasis on recruiting rather than retailing products. This is important. Many companies have similar programs that incentivize recruiting by rewarding new volume (new volume can only be generated by recruiting new participants). The FTC’s allegation directed at the AdvoCare Rookie Bonus is untested. It’s a reminder that companies that offer rewards or bonuses for new volume should be explicit in their program materials that the reward is based on new, verifiable retail sales volume and that the reward does not emphasize the recruiting of new distributors in the program description.
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Policies requiring retail sales to nonparticipant consumers should be in place and be enforced.
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Words and terms used in the compensation plan matter. Volume should be defined to reflect an emphasis on retail sales to nonparticipants. Many comp plans define volume as the volume from participant personal purchases and the volume generated from retail sales to nonparticipant customers. If volume is defined this way, the compensation plan can conceivably allow rewards to be earned based on participant purchases only, with no retail sales activity. Even if this is not how commissions are generated, a loose definition of volume could convince a regulator that all rewards available in a company’s compensation can be achieved with no retail sales activity.
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Companies must demonstrate that revenues are derived primarily from the retail sale of products to nonparticipant purchasers. The FTC views failure to collect this data, or the non-existence of such data, as indicative of an illegal pyramid scheme.
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Activity or maintenance requirements should ideally be based on retail sales volume, not personal purchases by program participants. At a minimum, any activity requirements of participant purchases should be limited to an amount that a participant can reasonably be expected to consume or use within the relevant time period.
Is Your Distributor Agreement Enforceable?
The inability to enforce the terms of the independent distributor (IBO) agreement is a recurring problem for many MLM companies. Can the company demonstrate that it has a legally enforceable and binding agreement with its independent sales representatives? A company does not want to discover in the middle of a lawsuit defending a consultant termination or retraining a rogue distributor that it cannot or is unable to enforce the terms of its consultant agreement.
The online enrollment process of IBOs poses a potential problem. All documents that comprise a company’s distributor agreement (such as online terms and conditions, policies and procedures) should be available, in their entirety, to a new distributor at the time of enrollment. A company should not process a distributor’s enrollment without creating a valid electronic record of (i) the distributor’s acknowledgment that she or he has reviewed the entire distributor agreement, and (ii) the distributor’s agreement to be bound by the terms of all such documents. This is particularly important for companies that incorporate policies and procedures or other documents that reference an online distributor agreement. If not done properly, a judge or arbitrator may decide not to enforce the policies and procedures because the company cannot prove that the distributor agreed to those terms at the time of enrollment. The result may be harsh—such as a company’s inability to enforce an arbitration provision, forum selection clause, or class action waiver—if those provisions are included in an unenforceable policies and procedures document.
A second enforceability issue can arise with similar or identical provisions in different parts of the distributor agreement (for example, a dispute resolution provision in the online terms and conditions and a second dispute resolution provision in a policies and procedures document). If a company amends one set of provisions but neglects to amend the other set, the two provisions may conflict and be unenforceable. This discrepancy in documents forced one MLM company to defend a class-action lawsuit that could otherwise have been avoided if not for conflicting provisions in the company’s independent distributor agreement and policies and procedures.
A third potential problem can occur when an independent distributor agreement is void due to unconscionability. An agreement is unconscionable (and unenforceable) if it is determined to be inherently unfair. State laws vary, but an unconscionability analysis is usually a two-step process. The first inquiry is focused on whether the contract is procedurally unconscionable, and the second inquiry focused on whether the contract is substantively unconscionable. A contract that is deemed to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable is legally unenforceable. Because most MLM companies use a standardized independent distributor agreement in which a prospective distributor is given no meaningful opportunity to negotiate the terms, the majority of MLM independent distributor agreements are likely to be deemed procedurally unconscionable. As a result, companies must ensure that their independent distributor agreements are not substantively unconscionable. In assessing substantive unconscionability, the primary inquiry is whether the agreement terms are mutual or one-sided. For example, a contract provision that requires a distributor to assert a claim against the company within one year from the date of the occurrence or breach—but does not require the company to do the same—is arguably substantively unconscionable. If your company’s distributor agreement contains numerous one-sided provisions that are overly favorable to the company, then the agreement (or certain provisions) may be unenforceable due to unconscionability.
Compensation Plans in Today’s Regulatory Environment
In the current regulatory climate, the FTC has prioritized scrutiny of MLM compensation plans. In the past two years, FTC Commissioner Noah Phillips and current and former FTC attorneys have stated their view that MLM compensation plans that emphasize recruiting can turn an otherwise legitimate business opportunity into an illegal pyramid scheme. The FTC continues to state publicly that aggressive scrutiny of MLM companies is one of the agency’s top priorities. It is therefore critical that MLM companies evaluate their compensation structures and business practices in light of FTC’s current interpretation of what constitutes an illegal pyramid scheme.
This heightened scrutiny means that all MLM companies—new and old, large and small—should undertake a review of their compensation plans to avoid getting caught in the FTC’s crosshairs. FTC attorneys have stated that the agency asks two preliminary questions when evaluating an MLM compensation plan:
- Does a compensation plan incentivize recruitment rather than product sales?
- Does the compensation plan create incentives for distributors to purchase more products than they actually need?
At first glance, these questions do not appear to pose much of a challenge. A company’s MLM compensation plan, in structure, terminology, and practice, should emphasize payment of compensation to program participants based on verifiable retail sales of products or services to bona fide, verifiable retail customers. Sounds doable, right? This is consistent with the FTC’s position in its 2016 enforcement actions against Herbalife and Vemma as well as the 2018 FTC Guidance to the MLM Industry. If these two questions mark the current regulatory guardrails for compensation plans, then most companies with current compensation plans are either operating in a compliant manner or capable of doing so with relatively minor modifications.
But the inquiry does not end there. In October 2019, former FTC attorney Andrew Smith announced three compensation plan characteristics that the FTC views as suggestive of an illegal pyramid scheme: threshold-based rewards, convex rewards, and duplication-based rewards. These concepts were reaffirmed by current and former FTC attorneys at the 2021 College of New Jersey MLM conference. Threshold-based rewards are rewards that begin or increase exponentially at specific thresholds (for example, earning a 4 percent commission for the first $1500 in product sales; 6 percent in commission for up to $5,000; and 8 percent for sales of more than $5,000).
Convex rewards are rewards where greater levels of expenditure by a program participant earn greater rewards. Duplication-based rewards are rewards that are only available for participants who recruit other participants (e.g., if there are rewards in a compensation plan that are not available to a program participant who has no downline but personally retails $1 million of product).
The vast majority of MLM compensation plans used by companies operating in the United States contain one, if not two, of these reward types. If your company’s compensation plan allows a participant’s commission percentage to increase at a specified volume threshold, then the compensation plan has a threshold-based reward. If your compensation plan offers rewards based on team volume, or rewards based on volume generated by personally sponsored participants, then your compensation plan has a duplication-based reward. These are two very typical features of MLM compensation plans. Yet, the FTC has made public statements suggesting that these features are characteristics of a business that is operating as an illegal pyramid scheme.
These potential new criteria for evaluating compensation plans are not grounded in case law or any published guidance to the industry. Moreover, this new interpretation appears to go beyond the Koscot definition of an illegal pyramid, which is “the payment by participants of money to the company in return for which they receive (1) the right to sell a product and (2) the right to receive in return for recruiting other participants into the program rewards which are unrelated to sale of the product to ultimate users.” Moreover, this criterion has not been challenged in court. We don’t yet know to what extent these characteristics will become part of a new definition of an illegal pyramid scheme. For the time being, companies should review and adjust their compensation plans as necessary to avoid FTC scrutiny. Below are some things to consider:
- Modern compensation plans should reflect that commissions and advancement awards are based primarily on verifiable retail sales volume rather than participant purchases.
- Regardless of a compensation plan’s terminology, an emphasis on recruiting over selling product is viewed by the FTC as indicative of an illegal pyramid scheme. In its 2019 complaint against AdvoCare, the FTC was critical of a Rookie Bonus that rewarded AdvoCare distributors who recruited at least three new distributors while generating sales volume from the new recruits. The FTC found this bonus to be indicative of an emphasis on recruiting rather than retailing product. This is important. Many companies have similar programs that incentivize recruiting by rewarding new volume (new volume can only be generated by recruiting new participants). The FTC’s allegation directed at the AdvoCare Rookie Bonus is untested. It’s a reminder that companies that offer rewards or bonuses for new volume should be explicit in their program materials that the reward is based on new verifiable retail sales volume and not emphasize the recruiting of new distributors in the program description.
- Policies requiring retail sales to nonparticipant consumers should be in place and be enforced.
- Words and terms used in the compensation plan matter. Volume should be defined to reflect an emphasis on retail sales to nonparticipants. Many comp plans define volume as the volume from participant personal purchases and the volume generated from retail sales to nonparticipant customers. If volume is defined this way, the compensation plan can conceivably allow rewards to be earned based on participant purchases only with no retail sales activity. Even if this is not how commissions are generated, a loose definition of volume could convince a regulator that all rewards available in a company’s compensation can be achieved with no retail sales activity.
- Companies must demonstrate that revenues are derived primarily from the retail sale of products to nonparticipant purchasers. The FTC views failure to collect this data, or the non-existence of such data, as indicative of an illegal pyramid scheme.
- Activity or maintenance requirements should ideally be based on retail sales volume, not personal purchases by program participants. At a minimum, any activity requirements of participant purchases should be limited to an amount that a participant can reasonably be expected to consume or use within the relevant time period.